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Abstract—This paper examines the problem of 
introducing advanced forms of fault-tolerance via 
reconfiguration into safety-critical avionic systems. This 
is required to enable increased availability after fault 
occurrence in distributed integrated avionic systems 
(compared to static federated systems). The approach 
taken is to identify a migration path from current 
architectures to those that incorporate re-configuration to 
a lesser or greater degree. Other challenges identified 
include change of the development process; incremental 
and flexible timing and safety analyses; configurable 
kernels applicable for safety-critical systems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The aerospace industry is divided into a number of 
sectors (Missiles, Military Aircraft, Civil Aircraft, etc). 
The development processes used to produce airborne 
computing systems are similar, at an abstract level. These 
processes can be described as a complex interaction 
between the technical definition and the procurement 
activities. Ideally, the technical process proceeds the 
procurement process, however, these often occur 
simultaneously, due to the long lead times on computing 
equipment (ruggedised for avionic use). The authors 
assert that this abstract process is a major source of 
technical problems and lifecycle costs, since hardware 
dependencies are introduced at an early stage. For 
example, the target architecture is specified to fine detail 
prior to software being written. The cost penalty 
associated with changing these early design decisions is 
significant. As a result these decisions become a major 
constraint on the down stream lifecycle activities. 
 
One potential solution for this problem would be to 
serialise system refinement and procurement. This is 
unlikely to ever be a viable option due to current and 
growing commercial pressures to reduce development 
time-scales - hence the abstract development model of 
parallel technical development and procurement is likely 
to remain for the foreseeable future.  
 
Another potential solution is to migrate towards 
distributed computing architectures, where applications 
are partitioned and allocated over (potentially) several 
computing resources. Such architectures offer flexibility 
which will mitigate (but not eliminate) the worst effects 
of the abstract systems development process. This 
flexibility allows mapping to specific computing 
resources to be delayed and modified much more cheaply 
and easily. Also, modular increments of total computing 
resource, both through development and during service, 
can be performed without invalidating certification / 
qualification evidence. To achieve this solution, a 
number of enabling technologies need to be available, 
from sufficiently fast hardware, through operating 
systems (that enable hardware abstraction for the 
application).  
 
An important “side-effect” of the distributed approach is 
enhanced fault-tolerance. Typically, avionic systems use 
“static” fault-tolerance, where each application, together 
with its dedicated hardware, is replicated. Distributed 
architectures enable enhanced fault-tolerance through 
reconfiguration – shared spare computing resources are 
provided in the system which are dynamically allocated 
to failing applications when necessary. 
 
The focus of this paper is the migration toward 
distributed architectures with enhanced fault tolerance, 
from the typically static architectures used in current 
avionic systems. The remainder of this section provides 
further motivation and background. In subsequent 
sections, we consider the specific challenges of the 
software development process; distributed fault-tolerant 
architectures; software architecture and timing analysis. 
 
We note that the British Aerospace Dependable 
Computing Systems Centre is allowed visibility of the 
processes used across a range of avionic system 
suppliers. Specific process information is restricted under 
the terms of commercial non-disclosure agreements. This 
breadth of visibility has allowed the authors to assert 
   
general observations and challenge the academic 
community to produce counter examples to the 
assertions. 
 
Background – Traditional v Distributed Avionic Systems 
Traditional aerospace computing architectures are 
“federated” or “black-box” in that individual applications 
are allocated to distinct processing resources. Such 
architectures, together with the software development 
process used to develop applications, can lead to a 
number of potentially costly problems, including: 
• resource under-utilisation - since an application 
may only be used during part of the mission or 
flight, its associated resource is only partially 
utilised. 
• inflexible fault-tolerance - fault-tolerance is often 
achieved by voting between multiple “computing 
lanes” which are identical in function. Typically, 
recovery from transient failures is possible. 
However, once a permanent fault condition is 
detected in a lane, it is shutdown. No attempt is 
made to reconfigure the system to bring back a failed 
application. 
• expensive timing analysis - each application is 
structured as a cyclic schedule, with interactions 
between applications performed in a similar cyclic 
manner across some communications media. Static 
schedules are difficult to change and analyse with 
respect to their timing properties. The problem is 
compounded when attempting to analyse the timing 
properties of communicating (distributed) 
applications. 
• expensive maintenance - changes to the software 
and/or hardware are problematic. Typically, entire 
systems need to be re-analysed for timing 
performance, re-tested and re-certified, even for a 
minimal change. 
 
As suggested earlier, one potential solution for future 
avionic systems is the use of a distributed integrated 
architecture [1,2]. Here, applications are structured such 
that parts of an application may be allocated to different 
processing resources. This enables: 
• efficient use of computing resources - achievable 
by enabling different applications to be split amongst 
different processing resources. Also, scheduling 
techniques, such as fixed-priority, enable more 
efficient resource usage. 
• fault recovery via reconfiguration - the flexibility 
provided by distributed integrated architectures 
enables reconfiguration. Note that reconfiguration is 
difficult in federated systems. 
• evolutionary not revolutionary software / 
hardware changes - achieved via technology 
transparency to enable exploitation of latest 
technologies. This requires kernel technologies with 
hardware independent interfaces. Portable code 
techniques can also be employed. Such technology 
transparency allows qualification evidence to be re-
used, without completely re-generating it. 
 
The flexibility given by integrated architectures provides:  
• increased resilience to faults - systems are 
generally more available, since they reconfigure 
“new” copies of failed applications onto spare 
processors. This is increasingly important as: 
• the amount of total software in avionics systems 
is increasing; 
• the proportion of safety critical software is 
increasing; 
• the percentage of safety critical software 
expected to fail operational is increasing. 
• easier static analysis of applications and systems - 
with respect to temporal and safety properties; 
• reduced maintenance cost –  since systems can 
reconfigure to exclude a faulty component, service 
intervals may be increased. 
These may generate cost saving over the product 
lifecycle (typically 30 years in the aerospace sector). 
 
Background – Enabling Technologies 
Migration to distributed architectures has been hampered 
by the lack of a number of inter-related enabling 
technologies. Delivering these enabling technologies 
through a combination of in-house R&D and exploitation 
of advances provided by the commercial computing and 
telecommunications industry is now an achievable goal. 
Use of these more distributed integrated architectures is 
now a viable mitigation strategy for the problems induced 
by the abstract systems development process described 
above. 
 
The use of distributed integrated architectures requires 
key enabling technologies to be available: 
• high speed processors and communications 
technologies - given the need for extremely fast 
computation and communication – e.g. the desirable 
performance advantages of an aerodynamically 
unstable aircraft can only be realised safely where 
the flight control system is guaranteed to achieve a 
defined high frequency response. 
• suitable development process – current 
development processes are optimised for the 
development of federated systems and do not exploit 
the benefits offered by distributed architectures. As 
noted earlier, for commercial reasons, these 
processes are unlikely to change radically. 
Therefore, one challenge is to enable distributed 
systems development by a series of incremental 
changes to the current process. 
• fault-tolerant distributed architectures – such 
architectures must provide sufficient fault-resilience 
to reduce design and maintenance cost, to 
counterbalance the inevitable increased initial 
certification cost. 
• configurable safety-critical kernels [3] – kernels 
allow software development with minimal 
dependence on the underlying hardware; support 
independence from specific compiler or code 
generator tools; enable integration of applications 
written in different languages. This may reduce long 
   
term maintenance costs, and support migration from 
existing aerospace products. We note that available 
commercial operating systems are, in general, not 
suitable for the exacting requirements of the 
aerospace sector. 
• timing analysis [4,5] and safety analysis [6] that 
can be applied at many stages of the life-cycle – 
static analyses, including those for both timing and 
safety, need to be scalable and incremental to reflect 
the nature of the architecture. This enables 
evolutionary maintenance activities to occur without 
requiring re-analysis of an entire system. Over the 
long term, the ability to reason about the 
performance of the application software will 
significantly decrease the cost of system 
maintenance activities. Also, the potential for 
reasoning about degraded modes of operation is 
introduced. 
• time bounded techniques for fault-detection and 
recovery via software reconfiguration – fault-
tolerance via software reconfiguration is considered 
important, to enable longer periods between 
maintenance; together with greater availability of full 
system functionality. We argue that the availability 
of techniques for performing reconfiguration of 
software enables a more flexible approach toward 
fault-tolerance in avionic systems. Offline 
reconfiguration can be used to enable a system with 
a hardware fault to be configured for flight so that 
the faulty component is not used. Dynamic 
reconfiguration can be used to recover the full 
function of a system after a failure during flight. In 
both cases, the full function of the system is not lost 
due to a failure. 
 
 
 
2. DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
In this section, we consider the development process for 
avionic systems. Progress is made from traditional 
processes through to a potential process for integrated 
distributed avionic systems.  
 
Idealistic Traditional Systems Development Process 
The traditional process of developing and procuring 
systems can be described, somewhat idealistically, as a 
collection of requirements, together with the validation of 
the completed system against those requirements, as 
   
shown in Figure 1. These requirements can be broken 
into: 
• Behavioural Requirements; 
• Dependability Requirements; 
• Procurement Requirements; 
• Platform Requirements. 
 
Behavioural requirements include all the expected 
behaviours and the prohibited behaviours. These can be 
represented in a variety of notations. The behavioural 
requirements could include mathematical models, 
prototypes and simulations in addition to an agreed text 
between the supplier and customer describing a joint 
expectation about the high level abstract behaviour of the 
system. 
 
Dependability requirements represent a set of constraints, 
which must be achieved concurrently with the 
behavioural requirements. These can be numerical 
reliability targets based on historical empirical evidence 
from similar systems or specific safety functionality such 
as interlocks and fire suppression systems. In the case of 
the fire suppression system it can be seen that the 
dependability requirement has a functional and a 
temporal component. Dependability requirements evolve 
in parallel with the system refinement from high level 
abstract requirements to detailed implementation. At each 
stage there is a systematic search for new or previously 
undiscovered dependability requirements. 
 
Procurement requirements constrain the development in 
terms of compatibility with existing fleet or making use 
of existing infra-structure (runways, radios, air traffic 
control, etc.). Increasingly, procurement policy has a 
significant influence on the shape and performance of the 
end system (e.g. “commercial-off-the-shelf” procurement 
policy, competitive tendering process, and international 
collaboration.). Lead times on the development and 
production of computing hardware into flight clearable 
LRI (line replaceable item, e.g. hardware component) and 
the push to reduce the overall system development time-
scale has lead to more parallelism between the 
constituent engineering tasks. 
 
Platform requirements are influential, on the design, as 
they are defined early in the lifecycle and are difficult, 
and potentially expensive, to change. Tolerances on 
weight, volume, vibration, power consumption, cooling, 
etc. are all drivers to the system, however their criticality 
is dependent on the platform. Whilst these constraints are 
common across the aerospace sector, the variation in 
criticality between a missile and a commercial aircraft 
leads to significantly different solutions in the different 
sectors of the aerospace market. 
 
The end product of all these (potentially contradictory) 
requirements is an engineering compromise - a collection 
of computing elements consisting of dedicated hardware 
and software components, interacting with sensors and 
actuators via a variety of communication mechanisms. 
Verifying that this end product and the high level 
specification are consistent and complete is not possible 
by any currently known method of direct comparison. In 
the absence of any direct method of comparison it is 
necessary to consider all the intermediate engineering 
processes. Overall compliance is inferred from the 
summation of a number of stepwise compliance activities 
performed concurrently with the refinement of 
requirements into detailed implementation. 
 
Note that all phases of the process are expected to 
contribute to the verification activity. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1 where all activities contribute to the Safety Case 
[6], which represents the collection of all evidence used 
in the certification of the system. 
 
Realistic Traditional Systems Development Process 
A realistic model of the Traditional Systems Engineering 
Process is shown in Figure 2. In this diagram the main 
intermediate engineering processes are shown. The 
diagram also represents the degree of parallelism, which 
exists between these intermediate process elements. The 
diagram is still idealistic to the extent that it does not 
show the iterations performed in order to incorporate 
modifications. The intermediate engineering processes 
illustrated in Figure 2 (in addition to those in Figure 1) 
are: 
• Functional Requirements; 
• Temporal Requirements; 
• Architectural Specification; 
• Equipment Specification; 
• Hardware Compliance Assessment. 
 
Functional requirements and temporal requirements are 
represented in a variety of notations. As the behavioural 
requirements are partitioned into the major elements of 
the system and subsequently into subsystems (which also 
addresses the dependability requirements), the refinement 
process derives timing requirements across the subsystem 
interfaces. The platform requirements and procurement 
requirements have little (if any) influence on the 
functional and temporal requirements as these are seen to 
be implementation detail. 
 
The hardware architecture and equipment specification 
process is heavily driven by procurement and platform 
requirements. Unfortunately, the behavioural and 
dependability requirements are refined in parallel with 
the architecture and equipment specification. As a result 
the partitioning of hardware and software functions does 
not necessarily drive the hardware specification, rather 
the hardware which has been specified imposes a 
constraint on which functions can be implemented in 
hardware.  
 
Delaying, the hardware architecture and equipment 
specification, until after the partitioning of requirements 
into hardware and software functions, would seem more 
logical. Unfortunately, the lead time from specification to 
equipment delivery is so long that making this a serial 
rather than a parallel activity would add significantly to 
the overall development time-scale. The implications of 
this are significant in terms of making the development 
   
more expensive and more obsolete by the time it enters 
service. In the current climate, which is trying to further 
shorten the overall development time-scale, removing 
this parallelism is not a credible option. 
 
The process of partitioning from functional and temporal 
requirements to hardware functions and software 
functions is not theoretically well understood. The 
pragmatic approach examines the capabilities of the 
defined hardware and its supporting architecture and 
allocates functions to hardware that can support them – 
e.g. complex wave integration. Whatever functionality is 
left is allocated to software. This process of “shoe-
horning” functions onto a defined standard of 
architecture and hardware is often felt to be less than 
optimal by the systems engineers and forms a source of 
subsequent modifications. 
 
Components are delivered from suppliers with initially 
outline claims of compliance with their specification. 
Progressively more evidence is supplied as qualification 
testing is performed at significant cost in terms of money 
and time (burn in tests, vibration tests etc). Requirements 
to change hardware become progressively more 
expensive as the delivery process nears completion as 
some or all of the qualification testing may need to be 
repeated. Hence there is a great incentive to try and live 
with any limitations which may be identified. 
 
A further problem is the integration of these components 
into the architecture. It is only at this time that interface 
inconsistencies, protocol functionality and real-time 
response can be assessed. Modifications to address these 
problems are expensive as they occur late in the 
development lifecycle. Once again there is pressure to try 
and live with any identified problems. 
 
It is clear that given this potential for defect introduction 
in this process, it is difficult to produce federated 
architectures that ultimately reflect the expectations of 
the behavioural, dependability, procurement, and 
platform requirements.  
 
The hardware compliance assessment activity 
1. Compares individual delivered components with 
their specification. 
2. Compares the expected behaviour of the integrated 
set of components against the expected performance 
of the overall architecture. 
Expecting complete compliance on both these levels is 
unrealistic. Deficiencies either translate into 
modifications or constraints and limitations on the 
use/operation of the system. Note there is increasing 
customer resistance to these limitations and constraints. 
 
Where modification is required the preference is to 
produce software modifications rather than hardware 
modifications. There are two main reasons for this. 
Firstly, software modifications are generally cheaper and 
have faster completion times. Secondly hardware 
modifications feed directly to recurring cost rather than 
"one off" development cost. 
 
   
However, the visible consequence of this is a large 
number of “uncontrolled” software modifications at the 
implementation stage. In practice, we observe that most 
of these modifications are directly due to the process 
used to specify the hardware architecture during 
procurement. The imposition of modifications onto the 
software causes the hardware specification to look 
artificially stable and more “right first time”, rather than 
being recognised as a fundamental contributor to the 
software modification requirement. 
 
Given that the process of defining and procuring 
hardware is only going to become more parallel rather 
than less, the issue to be considered is how do we reduce 
the number, severity and consequential damage of 
architecturally induced problems.  
 
Federated Architecture and the Abstract Systems 
Development Process – The Problems 
There are a number of problems with federated system 
architectures with respect to the development process: 
 
1. Obsolescence Management - Staying with the 
hardware and architecture defined by the original 
development for the duration of the aerospace product 
lifecycle (typically 30 years) causes problems in 
obtaining commercial computing spares which become 
obsolete (typically less than 5 years). In addition to the 
problems of spares, an aerospace product, which is 
failing to exploit the latest commercially available 
technology, will be seen as progressively less capable 
when compared to newer systems. 
 
2. Re-qualification Costs - The systems developed by the 
traditional process are qualified and certified as a single 
entity. This entity provides functionality from a complex 
interaction of interdependent software and hardware 
functions. Upgrading specific hardware or the complete 
architecture necessitates the complete re-qualification of 
the associated software functions even though these may 
not have changed. 
 
3. Modifications - The hardware specification and 
procurement process generates a significant number of 
modifications. These impose a cost and time penalty. In 
addition it is generally recognised that modified software 
is more likely to contain defects than original code. This 
fine tuning of application software to cater for specific 
limitations of a particular hardware configuration is a 
major barrier to re-use and the adoption of software 
engineering practices which encourage and promote re-
use. 
 
4. Dedicated Redundancy - The federated architecture 
requires the allocation of specific functions to a particular 
combination of hardware and software. Dependability 
requirements may require specific redundancy to be 
provided. Depending on the criticality 2, 3 or even 4 sets 
of identical hardware and software must be carried as 
loss of a specific piece of hardware means loss of a 
particular function. This is inefficient, expensive and 
impacts directly on our ability to achieve the platform 
requirements 
 
   
5. Elicitation and Verification of Temporal Requirements 
- There is no generally accepted process for the 
elicitation of timing requirements from domain specialist 
engineers. Whilst some requirements are expressed they 
are often found to be incomplete or over-specified.  
Over-specification can at best cause inefficient use of the 
available computing resource and at worst may trigger 
hardware upgrades late in the lifecycle, when the total 
available resource is found to be insufficient. Even if 
there is enough computing resource overall, the software 
may need to be re-distributed to achieve a more even 
spread of the processing load at a late stage of the 
development process. Incomplete requirements are often 
revealed at a late stage of the development, addressing 
these by modification is both costly and time consuming. 
Verification of timing requirements is made more 
difficult by the complex interdependency between the 
hardware and software functions and as a result almost 
any change to the hardware or the software requires a 
complete re-verification of all the timing requirements. 
 
Enabling Technology Constraints 
Figure 3 shows the context in which the distributed 
architecture sits and how it contributes to the mitigation 
of the problems identified in the previous section. The 
question could be asked that if “distribution” is such a 
great idea, why has it not been integrated before now into 
the systems development process? 
 
As stated in section 1, there are a number of enabling 
technologies which are required to make a practical 
embedded distributed architecture viable in the aerospace 
sector. These include adequate hardware bandwidth, 
suitable fault-tolerant hardware architectures, safety 
analysis, timing analysis and a suitable operating system. 
One role of the operating system is to implement the fault 
tolerance requirements including reconfiguration in 
response to hardware failure. In addition, it must support 
a variety of scheduling mechanisms in a way that allows 
reasoned arguments to be constructed about the real-time 
performance of the integrated system. 
 
The provision of such an operating system, with the 
required performance and evidence of high integrity, has 
an impact upon the software engineering process. 
Essentially, the process must produce applications that 
are independent of the underlying hardware and 
independent of the language/compiler/code generators 
used in development. Also, an elicitation process for 
capturing the real timing requirements from the engineers 
with specialist domain knowledge is required. The 
verification and demonstration of the achievement of the 
temporal requirements will make use of existing theory, 
but will require the development of tools to support the 
automation of the performance assessment. Note that the 
process illustrated in this section is amenable to these 
requirements. 
3. ENHANCED FAULT-TOLERANT 
ARCHITECTURES 
Fault-tolerant architectures have been used in safety-
critical aerospace systems for a number of years. 
Traditionally, they have been based around redundant 
computing lanes performing identical functions, with 
simple (and effective) fault-detection. In this section, we 
examine both traditional architectures, together with 
architectures more amenable to a distributed integrated 
avionics system. 
 
The architectures are examined from the following 
perspectives: 
• fault coverage – the faults that can be detected by 
the architecture. 
• fault detection – relates to how faults in the system 
are detected. 
• shutdown – the hardware and software that is 
shutdown on a fault. 
• recovery – the strategy used to recover from a fault. 
 
Traditional Federated Quadruplex / Triplex 
Architectures 
Figure 4 shows the typical configuration of applications 
in a federated avionic system. Essentially, each 
application has a dedicated set of sensors, processors and 
actuators. The figure shows one quadruplex application. 
Here, identical computing lanes cross-monitor the inputs 
to and outputs from, all lanes. Lanes falling outside some 
acceptable tolerance are shut down by the other lanes. 
This architecture has been used on military aircraft. 
Alternatively, a triplex architecture could be used. This 
architecture is used in civil aircraft, e.g. the Boeing 777 
[7]. 
 
Fault Coverage - Quadruplex architectures offer 
protection from single Byzantine failures, since there are 
sufficient correctly functioning lanes to identify the 
failing lane. We note that triplex architectures cannot, in 
general, detect a Byzantine failure. Quadruplex, hence 
Byzantine, fault coverage is provided for function, data 
transfer and peripheral devices (e.g. sensors, actuators, 
power supplies etc.). Zonal coverage is also quadruplex 
for quadruplex systems and triplex for triplex systems. 
 
Fault Detection – Fault detection is via cross-monitoring 
between lanes. This is commonly implemented in 
software – using a weighted mean system of comparing 
lane input/output values. Errors in sensor inputs or lane 
outputs are effectively masked using this system. Also, 
fault detection occurs by periodic “Built-In-Test” (BIT) 
functions, which, in general, perform basic local health 
monitoring functions within a lane. We note that the 
cross-monitoring software is (conventionally) stateless, 
therefore relatively error-free. 
 
Shutdown - After a first non-transient fault has been 
detected, a quadruplex system becomes triplex by 
shutting down the faulty component. Thus, if the fault 
   
occurred in a sensor, that sensor input is marked as failed 
– the inputs from the failed sensor are subsequently 
triplex. This still enables voting and hence agreement to 
take place on input and output values. We note that 
Byzantine protection has been lost for the faulty 
component.  
 
An entire lane maybe shutdown due to internal fault, e.g. 
failing BIT, resulting in a triplex system. Similarly, if in a 
triplex state when a lane fault occurs, the system reverts 
to duplex. Note that if a Byzantine fault had occurred the 
faulty lane may not have been shutdown. Hence, 
arguments need to be constructed to show that no 
credible Byzantine fault can occur. Subsequent faults are 
difficult to detect  (within a duplex system) – if there is 
disagreement on input and/or output value the fault 
cannot be out-voted. In this situation, additional internal 
(within a lane) health monitoring may help. 
 
Recovery – Typical quadruplex systems do not attempt 
any recovery via re-configuration. Instead, the failed 
component is given time to re-stabilise before being let 
back into the system. Once a previously failed 
component is deemed to be functioning within tolerance 
again, it maybe re-admitted fully into the system. This is 
determined by the lane comparing its inputs/outputs with 
those of the other lanes during the cross-monitoring 
process. Often, a failed component is not brought back 
into the system unless the pilot allows it – this prevents a 
transient condition occurring in vital control systems if 
the plane is performing some complex maneuver. 
 
Remarks – The quadruplex / triplex architectures 
described above are suited to the static federated systems 
within which they are found. Since a single application 
has dedicated computing resource (i.e. has four lanes just 
performing the single application), then the consequences 
of lane shutdown are localised within a single 
application. This enables simple fault detection 
mechanisms to be used, based upon data cross-
monitoring and voting. 
 
Restricted Integrated Fault-Tolerant Architecture  
Convention dictates that triplex fault-resilience is the 
minimum for safety-critical systems (with some noted 
exceptions, e.g. most digital aeroengine controllers have 
a duplex, or two-laned architecture). This may remove 
the need to use quadruplex systems, which are 
correspondingly more expensive to build and maintain 
than triplex systems. However, engineers are relatively 
keen to maintain adequate fault coverage after a first 
failure, hence the motivation for quadruplex system 
architectures, particularly in complex safety-critical 
systems such as flight control. 
 
We noted in section 1 that the trend in system 
architectures is away from federated and towards 
distributed integrated. In this section, we consider a 
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triplex architecture for a limited form of integrated 
system: 
• a computing lane contains a number of applications 
(c.f. traditional systems where a lane contains a 
single application). 
• an application is allocated to a single processing 
resource within a lane. 
• within each lane is a spare computing resource, 
which has (initially) no function allocated. 
• after a fault, spare computing resources in the system 
are reconfigured to provide the functionality that has 
been lost. 
Figure 5(a) shows an architecture that enables a limited 
form of re-configuration. Essentially, three lanes of 
identical computing elements are provided. Data-links 
between lanes are provided to enable cross-monitoring. 
On each lane, the same applications execute, with 
applications potentially split over one or more processing 
elements in a lane. We note that the allocation of 
application parts to processing elements is identical in 
each lane, at least initially. Hence triplex fault-resilience 
is achieved for each application. One processor on each 
lane is reserved as a spare. 
 
Fault-Coverage – Inherently, a triplex architecture does 
not provide coverage against Byzantine faults. After a 
fault and subsequent reconfiguration, the fault coverage 
will remain only if all three lanes remain operational. If a 
lane has failed completely (e.g. power supply failure), 
then even if the remaining lanes can support redundant 
copies of the failed applications (to maintain triplex 
function coverage), there will only be duplex zonal fault 
coverage. 
 
Fault Detection – Similar to traditional quadruplex, i.e. 
via lane cross-monitoring and “Built-In Test”. However, 
since applications are allocated to single computing 
resources within a lane, fault-detection is at two 
granularities: 
1. Lane – i.e. number of applications – if a fundamental 
part of the lane hardware fails, e.g. power supply. 
2. Processor – i.e. single application – if the application 
fails (detected by the cross-monitoring) or the Built-
In Test detects a local (within a computing resource) 
fault. 
 
Shutdown – When a fault is detected, the faulty 
component is shut down. To reflect the granularity of 
fault detection, shutdown is of either a lane or processor. 
This enables recovery to as near a fully operational 
system as possible, with close to original fault-coverage 
with a processor fault; or may have significant reduced 
coverage with a lane fault. Subsequent fault effects 
depend upon the state that the system is in when they 
occur. A potential scenario is shown in Figure 5 for a 
triplex architecture with four processing elements and 
three applications (hence one spare processor in each 
lane). In 5(a) the initial configuration is shown; 5(b) 
shows a single application shutdown, 5(c) shows a lane 
shutdown. 
 
Recovery – Recovery of failed sensors occurs in a similar 
manner to quadruplex systems, where they are monitored 
after a fault and brought back into the system after they 
have started to function correctly again.  
 
Recovery at an application level occurs by re-
configuration. In general, if a processor fault occurs, 
recovery is by configuring a spare processing resource 
within the same lane to be a “new” copy of the failed 
application. Clearly, depending upon the number of 
applications and spare processors within a lane, this 
could cope with a number of faults. When spare 
resources within a lane have been exhausted, recovery is 
by using spare resources within other lanes. If no 
resource is available, the failed application becomes 
duplex. Figure 5(d) shows the result of reconfiguring the 
failed application of 5(b) within the same lane. 
 
For a lane failure, recovery is by utilising spare resources 
within other lanes to place “new” copies of all failed 
applications. Figure 5(e) shows the result of 
reconfiguring all applications within the failed lane 
illustrated in 5(c) – note that only two of the three 
applications have triplex functional fault coverage, with 
no application having triplex zonal fault coverage. This is 
potentially extendable to downgraded operation modes 
not covered in this paper. 
 
Remarks – The restriction that an application is solely 
associated with a specific processor within a lane enables 
the simplistic fault detection mechanisms of the 
quadruplex architecture to be used. The major difference 
is that only the faulty part of a lane is shut down on fault 
detection. However, within this architecture, more than 
one application copy may be shut down by a fault – i.e. if 
a lane is shut down. 
 
Integrated Fault-Tolerant Architecture 
Taking the integrated architecture of the previous section 
one stage further, we no longer restrict the partitioning 
and allocation of applications: 
• a computing lane contains a number of applications 
(c.f. traditional systems where a lane contains a 
single application). 
• an application is composed of a number of 
application tasks and shared data areas. 
• constituent parts of the application (i.e. tasks and 
shared data areas) can be allocated across multiple 
computing resources within the same lane. 
• after a fault, spare resources are used to provide the 
functionality that has been lost. 
The fundamental difference between this architecture and 
that in the previous section is that each computing 
resource may contain (parts of) many applications. We 
assume that  
the same allocation of tasks and data is used for each lane 
(initially). 
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Figure 5(a): Initial Configuration.
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Figure 5(b): Single Processor Shutdown.
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Figure 5(c): Single Lane Shutdown. Figure 5(d): New Copy of Application 1.
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Figure 5(e): New (Partial) Copy of Lane.
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Fault Coverage – This is similar to the restricted 
integrated architecture, whereby full triplex coverage is 
only maintained if all lanes are at least partially 
operational. 
 
Fault Detection - As traditional quadruplex and the 
restricted integrated architecture, i.e. via lane cross-
monitoring and “Built-In Test”. However, now that 
applications are allocated to many computing resources 
within a lane, fault-detection is at three granularities: 
1. Lane – i.e. number of applications. 
2. Processor – i.e. single application. 
3. Task – i.e. a task within the application. 
Whilst the third form can still be provided by cross-
monitoring techniques, there is a potential for the 
introduction of software fault-detection techniques, e.g. 
see [8]. Such techniques are beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 
Shutdown – Similarly to the restricted architecture, fault 
detection leads to a shutdown of the faulty component. In 
this architecture however, the prospect of merely shutting 
down a software component is raised, to correspond with 
the detection of a fault within a task.  
 
Recovery – Recovery is via reconfiguration at a task 
level. A fault causes a number of effects: for a sensor 
fault, behaviour is as the previous architectures; other 
faults cause application tasks to be shutdown, from one 
for a task fault, through to all tasks for a lane fault. 
Therefore, reconfiguration requires a “new” copy of all 
shutdown tasks to be placed upon spare computing 
resources. For a task or processor fault, recovery is by 
configuring a spare processing resource within the same 
lane to be a “new” copy of the failed task(s). Clearly, 
depending upon the number of applications and spare 
processors within a lane, this could cope with a number 
of faults. When spare resources within a lane have been 
exhausted, recovery is by using spare resources within 
other lanes. If no resource is available, the tasks 
concerned become duplex. Note that even if one task is 
duplex within an application, with all other parts of the 
application triplex, the application only has duplex 
coverage. 
 
We note that reconfiguration at a task level requires 
knowledge regarding load and resource requirements of 
the tasks – this is addressed in sections 4 and 5. 
 
Comparison 
In this section, we compare the traditional quadruplex, 
restricted integrated and integrated architectures. 
 
Flexibility is clearly increased with the integrated 
architectures when compared with static federated 
quadruplex. However, additional run-time complexity is 
evident. The trade-off between the federated and 
integrated architectures is also dependent upon associated 
costs, such as potentially reduced numbers of hardware 
components in an integrated system and certification. 
 
The behaviour of the architectures when a fault occurs 
have some similarities. The behaviour of all architectures 
is non- deterministic when faults occur. For example, 
many separate sensor failures could occur, reducing 
coverage on those sensors, without altering the functional 
fault coverage of the system. The main difference lies in 
the behaviour of the architectures when complete 
applications. Unless a complete triplex lane is shut down, 
the fault coverage of the re-configuring architectures is 
far more flexible. For example, after this single failure, 
the quadruplex system is reduced to triplex, whilst the re-
configuring triplex architectures remain with the same 
coverage. A second lane shutdown for a quadruplex 
system will mean that system will become duplex. 
Comparatively, two faults in the same application under 
an integrated architecture results in a system with 
functional fault-coverage remaining triplex (although 
duplex zonal coverage). 
 
Hence, there is a trade-off between the extreme fault-
coverage of quadruplex systems with the more dynamic 
fault coverage of the distributed integrated architecture. 
 
 
4. SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE 
In this section, we consider issues pertinent to the 
software architecture with respect to the restricted and 
fully integrated architectures introduced in section 3. 
 
Computational Model 
Control applications are typically structured in three 
phases:  
1. Input – any data that is needed from sources external 
to the application is read, e.g. sensors, shared data 
etc. 
2. Compute – the actual computation is performed. 
3. Output – any data that needs to be passed to a 
destination outside the application is written, e.g. to 
an actuator or communications link. 
We note that this form of control application is supported 
by the aerospace world, in both commercial forms, e.g. 
commercial Integrated Modular Avionics [9,10], and the 
military integrated avionics effort [2]. 
 
For the restricted integrated architecture, we assume that 
an application consists of a single cyclic executive 
containing a number of such tasks. For the integrated 
architecture, an application is composed of a number of 
communicating tasks. Each task has the above structure, 
with one task’s output forming the input for the next task. 
 
Associated with each task in an application is state data, 
which is persistent across successive executions of an 
application 
 
Re-Configuration of Applications 
In the distributed integrated architecture, detailed in 
section 3, there are a number of identical active copies of 
a task. When a failure occurs, there are a number of 
   
phases that must be carried out to re-configure the system 
with “new” copies of the failed task(s): 
1. Fault-detection. 
2. Shutdown – this maybe for a single task (or 
application if a task is a complete application) or 
complete lane. 
3. Selection – here the kernel determines the spare 
processor onto which the “new” copy could be 
placed. 
4. Installation – a “new” copy of software is placed 
upon appropriate processor(s). 
5. State Transfer – if required, state is transferred to the 
“new” copy. 
6. Policed Execution – the “new” copy executes, 
although it is policed by the other remaining copies 
to build up a level of trust. 
7. Re-admittance – the “new” copy has been accepted 
by the other remaining copies, and is now allowed to 
execute and output results normally. 
 
This is illustrated by considering a failure, as shown in 
Figure 6. Here, the failure is illustrated by the 
acceptability of its output (i.e. state) falling when the 
fault is detected, and recovering after reconfiguration. 
The key to Figure 6: 
• Time tf – failure is detected. • Time tr - the reconfiguration commences with the 
selection of a suitable processing element onto which 
the new copy of the application is installed. 
• Time ti - installation commences. • Time ts - state transfer commences. • Time te  - state transfer is complete, with the new 
application copy is eligible to be executed.  
• Time ta - the new application is fully functional and 
re-admitted into the system. 
 
We note that during interval [tf, ta] the system is duplex. 
A subsequent fault would reduce the system to simplex. 
This reflects the “time-at-risk” of a secondary fault. 
Safety and timing analysis is required to show that this 
risk is acceptable. 
Note that the relative distances between the time points in 
Figure 6 are meaningless - only the ordering is important. 
 
One important issue is that of the state used by the new 
application copy. Methods of passing state to the new 
application are identified in the following subsections. 
 
State Transfer – Some applications always need a current 
copy of the state, for example navigation systems often 
need to know where they have been before they can 
calculate where they are. This state may be a single 
“snapshot” of state, or some form of state history from 
which the current state maybe calculated. This state may 
be large. 
 
For effective state transfer, the transferred state must be 
correct, else a failure may be introduced into the system. 
It is not sufficient to merely “vote” on the state of the 
other two applications in the group, as a fault cannot be 
masked. Also, an error may be present in the state that 
has yet to be detected. 
 
State Convergence - Some applications are essentially 
stateless, or at least the state of the new copy will 
eventually stabilise correctly if started from afresh, 
merely by using new inputs. This approach is less 
complex than state transfer, however, the length of time 
from execution to re-admittance of the application [te, ta] 
may be considerably longer. 
 
Hybrid - There is a trade-off between increased time at 
risk of second failure whilst in a duplex state (during 
state convergence) against the risk of commencing 
execution of the new application with faulty data (state 
transfer). Therefore, in general a hybrid solution can be 
used. Here, the minimum possible state is identified 
(offline) that is necessary for transfer. The new copy is 
then allowed to execute and stabilise sufficiently to pass 
the re-admittance test. 
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Figure 6: Response to Failure
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One implication of performing reconfiguration of 
applications is that mechanisms to support such 
reconfiguration are required. These are mainly functions 
that are performed at system initialisation time, or even 
offline as part of the process for writing the code to 
ROM: 
• Task Creation – when a “new” task is allocated to a 
processor, that processor must be able to allocate 
memory and adjust any kernel run-time data-
structures required. 
• Task Deletion – when a single task on a processor is 
shutdown, it must be eliminated from the processor 
and any kernel level data-structures. 
• Allocation – mechanisms for the identification of 
“where” to place a “new” copy of a task are 
required. 
• Code/Data Transfer – mechanisms for the transfer of 
“new” task copies and state – normal message 
transfer mechanisms may be tuned for smaller data 
transfers than needed here. 
• Flexible Scheduling – rather than traditional cyclic 
scheduling regimes, the kernel will need to support 
more flexible scheduling techniques that allow, more 
easily, the incorporation of additional tasks at run-
time. Additionally, the scheduling mechanisms may 
allow for accelerated execution (i.e. more frequently 
than normal) for a task that needs to process a state 
history to arrive at the current state. Scheduling 
mechanisms are considered further in section 5. 
 
 
5. TIMING ANALYSIS 
In this section we consider the timing analysis of systems 
using the hardware and software architectures described 
in sections 3 and 4.  
 
After an overview of timing analysis and timing 
requirements, we examine potential scheduling strategies 
for  distributed systems. Then, we introduce Reservation 
Based Timing Analysis [5], an approach to performing 
offline timing analysis in a modular manner throughout 
the system lifecycle. The associated online scheduling 
techniques for distributed integrated systems are also 
described. 
 
Timing Analysis - Background 
Meeting the timing and resource usage requirements 
imposed upon an avionics computing system involves 
many aspects of the software lifecycle. Fundamentally, it 
is the behaviour of the system at run-time which 
determines whether these requirements will be met. 
Usually, practitioners are required to demonstrate, to 
customers, that timing and resource usage requirements 
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Figure 7: Levels of Timing Analysis
   
will be met at run-time prior to system operation. 
Traditionally, this has been achieved by a combination 
of:  
• Limited off-line analysis of timing properties of 
code, by hand. 
• Exhaustive testing of the system, by exposing the 
system to as many combinations of input as possible, 
hoping to find any that lead to violation of timing 
requirements. 
The risk with these approaches is that unless testing is 
complete, there may be (untested) situations that give rise 
to timing requirements not being met at run-time. This 
risk becomes greater as systems become more complex, 
especially when distributed systems are considered. 
 
Alternatively, off-line timing analysis can determine 
whether timing requirements will be met at run-time. 
Rigorous mathematical analysis techniques are employed 
that require execution of the system software - hence can 
be performed without expensive system build [4]. Indeed, 
timing analysis can be applied at many stages of the 
system life-cycle. 
 
These alternative approaches are summarised in Figure 7. 
Bottom-up timing analysis reflects the traditional 
approach, with top-down analysis the analytical 
approach. In both cases, five distinct layers of analysis 
are identified: 
• Level 0 – Hardware - At this level, timing analysis 
considers the basic hardware operations that need to 
be quantified, e.g. the length of instructions on a 
processor; the physical transmission time across a 
communication medium. Pertinent behavioural 
characteristics of hardware are also noted, e.g. 
whether instructions on a processor are atomic, 
processor pipelines/caches. 
• Level 1 – Basic Blocks - A software component can 
be broken into basic blocks having a single entry/exit 
point, with no looping, branching or calls – thus they 
contain no requirement of resources other than 
processor. At this level, timing analysis considers the 
processor time requirements of a basic block, e.g. the 
worst-case execution time is calculated by summing 
the worst-case execution times of component 
instructions. 
• Level 2 – Process - The basic blocks identified in 
Level 1 may be composed into application processes 
by use of looping, branching and call instructions 
around the basic blocks. At this level, timing 
analysis considers the resource requirements of a 
process. The worst-case execution time of a process 
is calculated by examining the control-flow paths in 
the process, noting the worst-case execution times of 
basic blocks along the path. Also, we note other 
resources required by a process. 
• Level 3 – Processor - At this level, timing analysis 
acknowledges the (possible) presence of multiple 
processes upon a single processor, which inevitably 
compete for resources (e.g. processor time). When 
multiple processes are concerned, we must take 
account of process scheduling within the timing 
analysis. Hence, the behaviour of the scheduling 
policy is embedded within the analysis. This is the 
primary reason that a timing analysis is applicable to 
a specific scheduling policy. Also, that scheduling 
policy must be used at run-time, otherwise, the 
timing analysis performed off-line is meaningless. 
One example of processor timing analysis is for 
priority pre-emptive scheduling, given in [4]. 
• Level 4 - System - At this level, system wide timing 
analysis is considered. This takes into account the 
true concurrency in the system, due to the multiple 
distinct processors. The presence of a network is 
considered, together with contention for network 
access amongst the competing processors. 
 
As Figure 7 shows, timing analysis is layered, higher 
levels being dependent upon lower levels – an obvious 
conclusion being that all software and hardware has to be 
known before timing analysis can occur. However, top-
down timing analysis can be performed using estimated 
resource budgets for the resources expected to be 
required by the software. This allows sensitivity analysis 
of the system, that is allows playing of “what-if” games 
to estimate the effects of: 
• a particular software configuration; 
• a particular software configuration change. 
When specific resource requirements are known, they are 
used instead of the estimated budgets. 
 
Timing Requirements 
The timing requirements that may be placed upon a task 
or application, and can be checked by offline timing 
analysis, include: 
• Computational - Each application task may have a 
deadline that must be met under worst-case 
conditions. 
• Jitter - Tasks may have requirements on precisely 
when inputs are read and outputs emitted: 
• Release Jitter - given an event occurrence, 
release jitter is the difference between the 
earliest and latest release times of the process. 
The release time is when the event is recognised 
by the system and the appropriate process 
invoked, i.e. made runnable. 
• Input Jitter - at or after an event occurs, any data 
that is to be read by the subsequently invoked 
process has an interval within which it is valid. 
The input jitter is the difference between the 
time at which the data becomes valid and the 
latest time at which it remains valid. Input jitter 
is sometimes called input validity. • Output Jitter - when a data value is emitted by a 
process, output jitter represents the variation in 
time at which the value is emitted. Thus, output 
jitter is the difference between the earliest time 
the value can be emitted and the latest time it 
can be emitted. The latter is no later than the 
deadline of the process, by which time it must 
have completed execution. 
• Shared Resources - Where resources are shared, 
arbitration over resource access must occur via an 
access protocol. The access protocol may be 
   
embedded in hardware (e.g. concurrent 
asynchronous memory access) or software (e.g. 
protocols embedded in the scheduler). However, 
there are two fundamental timing requirements for 
shared resources (both of which are usually provided 
by the access protocol): 
• deadlock cannot occur; • the time that a process must wait to access a 
resource must be bounded. 
• Mode Changes - The system may execute in several 
modes, each (potentially) containing different 
process sets with different timing requirements. 
There are requirements to ensure that only the 
correct processes execute in a mode and that the 
transition between modes occurs without violating 
timing requirements. 
• Communications - Where data is passed from one 
process to a remote process across a communications 
media, the time taken for the communication must be 
bounded. 
 
Scheduling Approaches for Distributed Systems 
Clearly, timing analysis is dependent upon the methods 
used for scheduling access to resources (i.e. processor 
time, communications etc.). Static, time-driven 
scheduling solutions have been applied in the majority of 
existing industrial solutions for real-time avionics and 
safety critical systems [17]. Whilst such solutions can 
provide fully deterministic behaviour, their applicability 
must be questioned as system complexity increases 
through increased levels of integration distribution. 
Unfavourable characteristics of such solutions are 
significant and include the following: 
• Inflexibility - The final scheduling solution is not 
amenable to incremental change; any changes in 
application requirements/behaviour or resource 
availability imply a new static schedule. 
• Compromised application timing requirements - 
True timing requirements of processes (or 
transactions) are compromised as all processes must 
fit within a common, cyclic schedule. 
• Inefficiency – The quantity of unused resource may 
be significant, as when a process completes early, 
spare time is not reassigned to other processes. Also, 
when timing requirements are compromised (see 
above), processes are forced to run more frequently 
than they actually need. 
• Pessimistic worst-case estimates - Deviation in 
actual run-time behaviour beyond predicted worst-
case behaviour may result in information loss or 
cycle over-run. This encourages pessimism in 
design-time predictions of worst-case behaviour 
(computation times and rates). 
• Lack of responsiveness - End-to-end response times 
may be large (compared to the total computation 
time involved) due to the release of successive 
activities based on worst-case behaviour of all 
predecessors. Further, any pessimism in the 
estimation of worst-case execution times may be 
directly manifest at run-time as an actual delay in 
end-to-end response times. 
• Lack of visibility of true precedence relationships - 
In the final scheduling solution, there is no 
identification of true precedence relationships 
between processes executing on the same processor 
(or across multiple processors). Unless these 
relationships are otherwise documented at design-
time, this can result in problematic modification or 
upgrade of the system. 
 
Alternatively, a static fixed priority scheduling approach 
can be used [4]. This solves many of the shortcomings of 
the cyclic approaches above - for details on the trade-offs 
between static, time-driven scheduling and static priority-
based scheduling see Audsley [12] and Locke [13]. 
 
Reservation Based Timing Analysis 
The reservation-based approach [5] has been developed 
as a top down approach for timing analysis. It provides 
an abstract interface between application tasks and their 
required resources - tasks specify their time and other 
resource requirements in terms of a simplistic utilisation 
based specification. This incorporates the notion of 
“bounded non-determinism” - the amount of resource is 
stipulated, together with an interval within which the 
resource is required, although the precise time at which it 
receives that resource is determined by the scheduler. 
This gives the scheduler for each resource (i.e. processor, 
communications etc) a high degree of freedom in terms 
of how tasks are subsequently executed such that their 
timing specifications are met.  
 
Note that given the above abstract interface between 
application and resource schedulers, the application is not 
dependent upon the specific scheduling approaches 
employed - it merely places a requirement upon them to 
provide sufficient resource within a given time frame. 
 
Conventionally, resource reservation has been used for 
scheduling communications and multimedia applications 
[11]. These approaches have not been aimed at safety-
critical applications, with little concept of off-line timing 
guarantees. Neither do they provide an end-to-end 
scheduling solution over a common set of processing and 
communication resources. However, resource 
reservation, when combined with the approaches such as 
fixed priority scheduling for individual processing 
resources, can be extended into the safety-critical 
domain. 
 
We may compare the timing analyses associated with the 
cyclic, fixed priority and reservation based approaches: 
• Cyclic – allows quantifiable off-line computation 
specification and timing guarantees; inflexible 
scheduling (not easily changed), hence not easily 
scalable. 
• Fixed Priority - allows quantifiable off-line 
computation specification and timing guarantees; 
flexible scheduling; non-partitionable timing 
analysis, hence not easily scaled. 
• Reservation Based - allows quantifiable off-line 
computation specification and timing guarantees; 
   
flexible scheduling and scalability via partitionable 
timing analysis. 
 
For safety-critical systems, the reservation-based 
approach has a number of phases [5]: 
• System Decomposition – here the system is 
decomposed into constituent applications, tasks, 
shared data areas etc. 
• Interaction Identification – here the interactions 
between various components of the system are 
identified, e.g. a task may need to use a specific data 
resource in a mutually exclusive manner. 
• Resource Reservation - off-line timing guarantees 
require reservation of capacity or bandwidth on each 
resource required by a task. This is based upon 
worst-case resource requirements.
  
• Offline Timing Analysis – now, a scheduling 
approach is defined for each resource, with 
associated timing analysis used to determine whether 
timing requirements will be met. 
• Online Timing Analysis – one property of the 
reservation approach is that all analysis is scalable 
and partitionable. This implies that at run-time, if a 
“new” component is allocated to a processor, only 
the timing analysis of that component need be 
considered. This contrasts to conventional static 
priority scheduling theory that requires analysis of 
the entire system [14]. 
 
In the remainder of this section, for brevity, we consider 
only the resource reservation and timing analysis phases. 
 
Offline Timing Analysis - The reservation based approach 
assumes that a suitable offline timing analysis is 
available, amenable to the reservation of resources at a 
high level. This can be achieved using fixed priority 
timing analysis, assuming the use of fixed priority 
scheduling at run-time [4]. Also, intra-lane 
communications is assumed to be via a demand-driven 
protocol to an underlying media – i.e. as long as the total 
worst-case demand on the communications media is less 
than some maximum, then all messages have a maximum 
known transmission time.  
 
For the restricted architecture, the timing analysis is 
simplistic. Since an application consists of a single task 
allocated to a dedicated processor, we only require that 
the computation time of the task is no more than the 
deadline of the task.  
The fully integrated architecture is more complex in 
terms of timing analysis. Here we have to consider the 
allocation of tasks to processors within a lane, together 
with the effects of tasks conflicting for resources on a 
processor - that is the scheduling policy itself, which we 
have assumed to be fixed priority. We assume that 
priorities are assigned to tasks in a deadline monotonic 
fashion [15], whereby the shortest deadline task has the 
highest priority, the second shortest deadline has the 
second highest priority etc. 
 
We use the utilisation-based test of Lui and Layland [16], 
noting that optimal feasibility is given in [4]. The 
condition to guarantee that deadlines will be met at run-
time is that the total utilisation of a processor must not be 
greater than 69%. We note that the limitation of 
utilisation to 69% is not necessarily a restriction for 
safety-critical aerospace systems where a typical 
customer permits no more than 50% usage. 
 
Online Timing Analysis - Inevitably, if a system 
reconfigures, the temporal behaviour of the system will 
change. However, the timing analysis approach outlined 
thus far caters for this. 
 
For the restricted integrated architecture online 
reconfiguration causes no problem regarding timing 
analysis from a processor timing perspective, since an 
application is placed onto a “clean” processor. However, 
we must account for any extra communications 
requirement within a lane (e.g. if a “new” copy of a failed 
task is placed in a different lane). Thus we must maintain 
condition regarding total communications demand. 
 
For the integrated architecture, during allocation of a 
“new” copy of a task to a processor, we must maintain 
the 69% utilisation condition – this will incur only a 
simple addition of the “new” task’s utilisation to that 
existing on the processor. Similarly, we must check 
communications bandwidth in exactly the manner 
required for the restricted architecture. 
 
We note that task priorities will change if a “new” task is 
allocated to a processor – however, this will not affect the 
utilisation test. 
 
During the reconfiguration process, code and data may 
need to be passed across the network. This has obvious 
problems when other tasks within the lane are using the 
network for passing data as part of normal operation. We 
note that within the communications model assumed, the 
maximum available bandwidth available for transferring 
code/data is the difference between current load and 
maximum load (i.e. the difference in the previously stated 
communications bandwidth expression). Clearly, the 
available bandwidth affects the maximum time it can take 
to  transfer the code/data. 
 
Online Scheduling Mechanisms - As suggested in section 
4, after a “new” copy of a task is allocated to a processor, 
some state may also be allocated. If this state is in a form 
of a history, e.g. the last 10 sets of inputs, then these must 
be run through the task before it has any real chance of 
being accepted into the system by the other “older” 
copies. However, to enable this, we must run the task 
faster than dictated by its period until it has caught up 
with the other copies. 
One simple method for achieving this is to let the task in 
question use up all available spare capacity on the 
processor – which will be at least 31% given the 
requirement for a total utilisation of no more than 69% in 
order to facilitate offline guarantees.  
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 6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper describes the observed process by which 
aerospace computing systems are developed. At an 
abstract level this process is common across all sectors of 
the aerospace industry (e.g. missiles, military aircraft, 
civil aircraft, etc.). This abstract process is unlikely to 
change in the foreseeable future. However, the abstract 
process is a major cause of hardware software integration 
problems and consequential lifecycle costs. 
 
Migration to distributed architectures provides a 
mitigation process against the worst effects of these 
hardware/ software integration problems. However a 
number of enabling technologies need to be developed to 
allow the use of distributed architectures with high 
integrity real-time avionic applications. These include a 
suitable development process, distributed fault-tolerant 
architectures, safety-critical kernels and scalable timing 
analysis. This paper has examined these enabling 
technologies and proposed outline solutions. 
 
One key feature of moving to distributed integrated 
architectures is the provision of enhanced fault-tolerance 
and increased availability. Traditional static approaches 
do not fit in well with the flexibility of the distributed 
integrated architecture – or at least do not utilise the full 
potential of the architecture. To support integrated 
architectures together with fault-tolerance, this paper has 
investigated the migration path from static fault tolerance 
approaches through to reconfiguration for distributed 
systems. In addition this paper has provided analysis to 
bound the temporal behaviour of fault-tolerant integrated 
systems in a scalable manner. 
 
The main conclusion of this paper is that the migration to 
distributed avionic architectures is not only technically 
possible, but will have positive financial benefits to 
engineers adopting the approach, in terms of reduced 
lifecycle costs. 
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